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Using complete order books from the Korea Stock Exchange for a four-year period including the 1997
Asian financial crisis, we observe (not estimate) limit order demand and supply curves for individual
stocks. Both curves have demonstrably finite elasticities. These fall markedly, by about 40%, with
the crisis and remain depressed long after other economic and financial variables revert to pre-crisis
norms. Superimposed upon this common long-term modulation, individual stocks’ supply and demand
elasticities correlate negatively at high frequencies.  That is, when a stock exhibits an unusually elastic
demand curve, it tends simultaneously to exhibit an unusually inelastic supply curve, and vice versa.
These findings have potential implications for modeling how information flows into and through stock
markets, how limit order providers react or interact to information flows, how new information is capitalized
into stock prices, and how financial crises alter these processes. We advance speculative hypotheses,
and invite further theoretical and empirical work to explain these findings and their implications.
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1.   Introduction 
Complete limit order books, with each entry flagged as a buy or sell, for all Korean listed 
stocks from December 1996 to December 2000 let us observe the whole demand and supply 
curves of limit orders for each individual listed stock at any instant in time.  We do this twice 
each day – once at the beginning of trading and again at 2:30 PM, half an hour before the 
market’s close.
1  Since the market opens with a call auction, but then switches to continuous 
trading, this lets us explore demand and supply under the two microstructure alternatives. 
Since our sample period includes 1997 and 1998, we can also compare demand and supply 
curves before, during, and after the Asian financial crisis. 
Because we observe entire demand and supply curves for limit orders, we measure the 
elasticity of each curve separately and directly, rather than jointly and by inference from 
prices and quantities traded.  This sidesteps entirely the standard identification problems 
associated with elasticity estimation using observed quantities traded and market prices (or 
prices near the market prices). This also lets us compare the two elasticities and investigate 
the  relationship between them. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to 
investigate these issues.  
Our main results are as follows. 
 First, individual stocks’ limit order supply and demand elasticities are significantly 
less than infinity, in that their reciprocals differ significantly from zero. This is consistent 
with theories of information capitalization that derive stock prices from the intersections of 
finitely elastic demand and supply curves for each stock (e.g., Harrison and Kreps, 1978; 
Grossman and Stiglitz,1980).  A caveat is in order, for our limit order books do not, of 
course, reveal the total demand and supply that would arise at each hypothetical price.  These 
totals would be limit orders already in the books plus new limit orders and market orders that 
                                                 
1 The KSE was open Saturday mornings until December 5, 1998, so on Saturdays during that period the second elasticity is 
estimated at 11:30 AM instead of 2:30 PM.  Dropping these observations does not qualitatively change any of our results.    2
would have been submitted were the price to have moved to that hypothetical level.   We only 
observe the first of the three components, so our elasticities of limit order supply and demand 
may well underestimate the elasticities of the total supply and demand curves for individual 
stocks. In Korean data, this problem is mitigated because market orders are little used and 
because limit orders are costless unless executed, so a shareholder willing to sell at a price 
above the current market price, for example, has nothing to lose except private information 
by submitting out of the market sell limit orders.     
Second, both demand and supply elasticities exhibit a common long run modulation, 
which change dramatically during the Asian financial crisis. Before the crisis, both average 
around 36. That is, a one percent price change commands a 36 percent change in quantity 
demanded or supplied. Both values drop to roughly 22 after the crisis. Unlike many other 
economic and financial indicators, which fluctuate dramatically around the crisis before 
reverting to their pre-crisis levels, individual stocks’ limit order elasticities remain at these 
new average levels – apparently permanently. This implies a permanently elevated 
heterogeneity of investors’ valuations after the crisis. The direction of this shift is intriguing, 
for post-crisis reforms are thought to have enhanced transparency and the advent of online 
trading is thought to have reduced transactions costs (Kim and Kim, 2008; Kwak, 2007). 
These findings raise the possibility of elevated information asymmetry and/or risk aversion, 
constraining information flow through a stock market years after a major financial crisis, with 
reduced limit order depth around market prices perhaps leaving stock prices more vulnerable 
to liquidity-driven fluctuations.   
Third, superimposed on this common long run modulation, the two elasticities exhibit 
a negative correlation at high frequencies. That is, stocks that develop unusually elastic 
demand curves tend simultaneously to develop unusually inelastic supply curves and vice  3
versa. This high frequency correlation is more strongly negative in 2:30 PM elasticities than 
in opening auction elasticities.  
This finding raises the possibility of a feedback. For example, demand elasticity might 
fall as buy-side limit order book depth evaporates in response to aggressive sell-side orders 
that flatten a stock’s supply curve. This sort of feedback reinforces the importance of 
selecting relatively information-free changes in quantities demanded or sought when 
estimating individual stocks’ demand or supply elasticities (Shleifer, 1986; Wurgler and 
Zhuravskaya, 2002). Such feedback is also consistent with the conclusions of French and 
Roll (1986), Roll (1988), and others regarding information propagation in financial markets: 
most new information is uncovered by private investors and revealed sequentially through 
their trading. 
Because limit orders greatly preponder market orders in Korea (See Section 3.2 
below), and because Korean limit order books retain considerable depth well away from 
market prices, we can measure elasticities across broad price ranges, consistent with 
economically significant fundamental valuation heterogeneity across limit order providers.  
This complements previous work using strategic limit order placement near the market price 
to gauge local elasticities (Kalay et al., 2004).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses other relevant 
research. Section 3 discusses the data and elasticity measurement procedure.  Section 4 
describes our findings, and Section 5 concludes.    
 
2.   Relation to Previous Studies   
The wheelhorses of asset pricing (Markowitz, 1952; Tobin, 1958; Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 
1965) postulate that individual stocks have infinitely many perfect substitutes in other stocks 
or portfolios, and so have horizontal demand and supply curves. A parallel literature assumes  4
individual stocks have finitely elastic demand and supply schedules reflecting heterogeneous 
valuations across investors (e.g., Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980).  
The virtues of the wheelhorses are elegance and simplicity; those of Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) and their descendents are compatibility with increasingly persuasive – though 
still disputable – empirical evidence of economically significant valuation heterogeneity. This 
debate turns on abnormal returns associated with private information (French and Roll, 1986; 
Roll, 1988); secondary offerings (Scholes, 1972; Allen and Postlewaite, 1984; Mikkelson and 
Partch, 1985; Loderer et al., 1991); repurchases (Bagwell,1992); and index revisions 
(Shleifer, 1986; Harris and Gruel, 1986; Jain, 1987; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991; Beneish and 
Whaley, 1996; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997; Liu, 2000; Kaul et al., 2000; Greenwood, 2005).  
Also consistent with valuation heterogeneity are finitely elastic demand and supply schedules 
observed in auctions (Bagwell, 1992; Kandel et al., 1999; Liaw et al., 2000); patterns in near-
market limit orders (Kalay et al., 2004; Sandås, 2001), inexplicably large normal trading 
volumes (Varian, 1985, 1989); persistent pricing anomalies (Shleifer, 2000; Shiller, 2002), 
and historical accounts of investor behavior during alleged stock market manias and panics 
(Kindleberger, 1978). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) go furthest, arguing that a realistic 
assessment of arbitrage costs precludes the assumption of homogenous information.   
Elaborations of the basic Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) framework posit investors 
with different information sets (Blough, 1988; Glosten, 1994), different ways of processing 
information (Hindy, 1989), different abilities to process information (De Long et al., 1990, 
Barber and Odean, 2000; Grinblatt and Han, 2005), different priors (Kandel and Pearson, 
1995), differences of opinion more generally (Varian 1985, 1989; Harris and Raviv, 1993; 
Kandel and Pearson 1995; Fama and French 2007), and different time preferences (Foucault 
et al., 2005).  Glosten’s (1994, p. 1129) observation that “the possibility of information- 5
motivated trades … implies that the schedule of offers is generally upward sloping” pertains 
to most such approaches.   
These approaches are clearly interrelated. For example, heterogeneous impatience 
might reflect heterogeneous beliefs about the future, heterogeneous abilities to predict the 
future, or heterogeneous levels of irrational optimism or pessimism. Nonetheless, 
heterogeneous impatience attracts special interest in the microstructure literature as 
potentially consistent with information set homogeneity if investors have heterogeneous and 
exogenously determined levels of impatience. For example, investors confronted with sudden 
medical or legal bills might knowingly sell shares at depressed prices to obtain cash 
immediately.  Parlour (1998) achieves this by assuming (p. 804) that investors price common 
future cash flow estimates with discount rates drawn from an exogenously given distribution.  
Patient investors can thus gain by placing limit orders above and below a stock’s 
fundamental value, providing immediate execution to impatient investors (Handa and 
Schwartz, 1996).  Such models explain locally elastic demand and supply curves for limit 
orders near the market price (Sandås, 2001; Kalay et al., 2004), since competition between 
providers of immediate execution precludes limit orders far away from the market price.  Our 
finding of substantial limit order depth far away from market prices, while not inconsistent 
with heterogeneous patience, is arguably more consistent with other drivers of heterogeneous 
valuations, such as heterogeneous information.    
Hollifield  et al. (2004, 2006) model impatience and information heterogeneity in 
concert, and conclude that the two are inseparably confounded and must be considered jointly.   
This is because “traders with high private values submit buy orders with high execution 
probabilities. Traders with low private values submit sell orders with high execution 
probabilities. Traders with intermediate private values either submit no orders, or submit buy 
or sell orders with low execution probabilities” (Hollifield et al., 2006, p. 2760). Intuitively,  6
investors with private information provide liquidity at better prices than other potential 
providers, making actual liquidity provision a by-product of heterogeneous valuations.  This 
prediction is confirmed experimentally (Bloomfield et al., 2005). 
Since we directly observe both demand and supply elasticities, we can also test for 
relationships between them. Valuation heterogeneity driven by patience heterogeneity is 
consistent with a static limit order book.  But if investors have different information or 
different information processing capabilities, they should monitor each other’s trades to infer 
each other’s private valuations (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
This implies a dynamic feedback in limit order books, with uninformed limit order providers 
reacting to likely informed trading by withdrawing limit orders to reduce expected adverse 
selection costs (Harris, 1998; Parlour, 1998; Sandås, 2001; Goettler et al., 2009).   
Our finding of a negative correlation between supply and demand elasticities at high 
frequencies validates the importance of investigating these dynamics, and suggests directions 
for future theoretical work in this area.  A formal model is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
the logic can be laid out readily.  Assume the information propagation framework proposed 
by French and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988) is correct: a specific subset of investors are the 
first to learn of new information, and others only learn of it by watching for unusual trading 
patterns that signal new private information.  As trades execute at changing prices, limit order 
providers observe the valuations of other investors, and use this information to update their 
own fundamental value estimates, as well as the uncertainty they attach to those estimates; 
and hence also their limit orders. This point seems especially important given Roll (1988), 
who shows that stock price fluctuations usually do not correspond to public information 
events. From this, he infers that stock price changes are typically caused by investors seeking 
to gain from private information they acquire. This suggests that traders on one side of the 
limit order book may often be at an information advantage to those on the other side.  For  7
example, if a subset of investors learns a stock is underpriced, they should enter large buy 
orders at or just above the market price, flattening the demand curve. Seeing these executed, 
uninformed sell-side investors would presumably withdraw limit order depth near the market 
price, steepening the supply curve.  Such a feedback might be represented with an impact 
function, extending Kyle (1985) or Sandås (2001); or by generalizing the “crowding out” 
effect in Parlour (1998) or Goettler et al. (2009).  
Consistent with the intuition underlying these conjectures, Kavajecz (1999) finds 
specialists and limit order traders in the U.S. reducing depths around information events, 
thereby reducing their exposure to adverse selection (Hollifield et al., 2004, 2006).  Also 
consistent with this intuition, Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) report limit order traders 
remaining inactive or even withdrawing when the plummeting Dow Jones Industrial Average 
triggered circuit breakers that halted all trading on October 27, 1997. 
 
3.   Measuring Elasticities 
This section describes how we measure elasticities of limit order demand and supply of 
individual stocks.  It first describes the trading system of the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) 
and the raw trade and quote data it generates, then how we construct demand and supply 
schedules for each stock twice a day, and finally how we summarize the shapes of those 
curves as elasticities. 
 
 3.1.   Market Microstructure  
The KSE is an order driven market, in that it has no designated market makers or specialists.  
Any investor is free to make a market in any stock, however this entails certain costs.  All 
investors, including brokers, pay a 0.3% stamp tax on executed sales. Online trading started 
in 1997 with fees of 0.5%, matching standard brokerage fees at the time.  But online fees fell  8
sharply after June 1998 as competition began in earnest.  Tick sizes range from 0.1% to 0.5% 
depending on a stock’s price range. For example, a ₩5,000 stock is priced in ₩5 increments, 
while a ₩50,000 stock is priced in ₩50 ticks. Bid-ask spreads are thus not entirely 
endogenous.   
  The investor base also changes with time.  Before May 1998, foreign ownership was 
capped, limiting foreigners’ ability to buy aggressively if the firm already had large foreign 
blockholdings.  After May 1998, all such restrictions disappeared.   
Trading begins at 9:00 AM with a call market – an auction in which accumulated bids 
and offers, taken as simultaneous, are matched to generate one opening price for each stock.  
In our data, 19.10 percent of buy orders and 21.14 percent of sell orders are submitted to 
opening sessions.   
Subsequent prices, until 10 minutes before the closing time at 3:00 PM, are set in 
continuous trading.
2  In the last 10 minutes, another auction market session determines prices. 
Orders not fully filled in the opening auction pass into continuous trading unless cancelled or 
revised.  An automatic trading system records all outstanding limit orders and automatically 
crosses new market and limit orders with these, or with opposite market orders.
3   The 
computerized order-routing system prioritizes by price and then time.   
 
3.2.  Trade and Quote Records Data 
Our Korean Stock Exchange Trade and Quote (KSETAQ) data are computer records from 
this system.  They include all KSE transactions and limit orders – filled and unfilled.  Each 
record gives a ticker symbol, a date and precise time; a flag for buy versus sell orders; and, 
for limit orders, the price.  We include only transactions involving common shares, so that 
                                                 
2 Before May 22, 2000, the KSE held separate morning (9:00 AM to 12:00 AM) and afternoon (1:00 PM to 3:00 PM) 
sessions, each commencing with a call market. 
3 For additional detail, see, e.g., Choe et al. (1999).  9
each firm is represented by only one listed security.   
We can further separate data used in the opening auctions from continuous trading 
data.  Margin and short sale orders are also specially flagged.  Our sample contains complete 
data from December 1
st 1996 to December 31
st 2000, and Table 1 summarizes its 
composition.   
  
[Table 1 about here] 
 
  In constructing demand and supply schedules, we focus on limit orders because 
market orders, by definition, do not specify prices.
4  Also, market orders are a very small 
fraction of total orders on the KSE.  Table 1 shows limit orders comprising 94.78 percents of 
buy orders and 92.99 percent of sell orders.  The rarity of market orders likely reflects their 
novelty.  Market orders were introduced by the KSE on November 25
th 1996, only a few days 
before our sample period begins, and remained little used.
5  We hope to explore this event 
and its implications in future work. 
We then take two snapshots per day of each stock’s complete limit order book.  The 
first is at the opening auction, and the second is at 2:30 PM – thirty minutes before trading 
ends. Unexecuted limit orders expire at the end of the day, so one day’s limit orders do not 
typically reappear the next day.  
 
3.3.   Demand and Supply Schedules  
To gauge elasticities, we first plot out the limit order demand and supply schedules of each 
individual stock – first in the opening auction and then at 2:30 PM amid continuous trading.  
                                                 
4 Bloomfield et al. (2005) and Kaniel and Liu (2006) argue that informed investors should prefer limit orders to market 
orders. Thus, limit orders are likely more useful for gauging information heterogeneity among investors.  
5 One financial analyst we asked about this proposed a starkly behavioral motive, resonant of the “default option” bias 
explained in Thaler and Sunstein (2008):  the standard electronic form for entering orders has a blank for price, so most 
investors enter one.  10
This is done precisely as in economics principles textbooks, and is best illustrated with an 
example.   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
  Figure 1 graphs the demand and supply schedules on November 11
th 2000 of 
Samsung Electronics, a large and heavily traded KSE listing.
6  These graphs are constructed 
by horizontally summing all limit orders that would execute at each theoretical price.
 The 
sum of all buy orders that would execute at a given price p  is the demand for Samsung 
Electronics at that price. As the price is decreased, tick by tick, successively more buy limit 
orders join the executable list so the demand curve reaches further to the right at lower prices. 
The sum of all sell orders that would execute at price p   is analogously the supply of 
Samsung Electronics shares offered at that price.  Again, as the price rises in one tick 
increment, additional sell orders join that sum and the supply curve extends increasingly far 
to the right at successively higher prices.   
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
  The demand and supply schedules at both the opening auction and 2:30 PM resemble 
those in standard economics textbooks, with the obvious proviso that the area to the left of 
the market price is unobservable in continuous trading.   Figure 2 shows Samsung 
Electronics’ demand and supply schedules at 15-minute intervals throughout the day 
including the opening and closing auctions.  The 2:30 PM snapshots are typical.  Graphs on 
other dates and for other stocks look similar to those shown in the figures.   
                                                 
6 We randomly choose 3 other stocks from large, medium and small capitalization groups. These graphs all resemble Figure 
1.   11
  Using this technique, we construct supply and demand curves for each listed stock 
twice each day, precisely as in Figure 1.  We begin by constructing analogs of Figure 1 for 
each stock j.  For each bid price p, we sum the bid orders that would execute to obtain 
demand
7   
 
[1]  ) ( ) (
1 p p n p d bj
B
b bj j ≥ =∑ = δ  
 
with b an index of bid limit orders, nbj the number of shares sought in order b, and  ) ( p pbj ≥ δ  
an indicator set to one if order b executes at price p and to zero otherwise.   The supply of 
stock j at p is analogously defined over ask limit orders, indexed by a, as follows. 
 
[2]   ) ( ) (
1 p p n p s aj
A
a aj j ≤ =∑ = δ   
 
For each stock, at any point in time, we thus map price p into a total quantity of stock 
j demanded, dj(p), and a total quantity supplied, sj(p).  This technique reveals demand and 
supply schedules for each stock at each day’s opening auction and again at 2:30 PM. Note 
that these demand and supply schedules are observed, not estimated.  Simultaneous equations 
identification problems do not arise. 
 
3.4.   Alternative Approaches to Measuring Elasticities 
Kalay et al. (2004) measure demand and supply elasticities for stocks traded on the Tel Aviv 
Stock Exchange from limit orders adjacent to market prices. They report unambiguously 
                                                 
7 When an order is submitted but subsequently cancelled, we exclude it in constructing the demand and supply schedules.  
Similarly, for any revised order, we use the revised price and/or quantity.  12
finite elasticities, but caution that their estimates depend critically on their assumptions about 
the shareholder base.   
Specifically, they measure elasticities as percentage changes in quantities divided by 
percentage changes in prices and take the former to be the quantity offered or sought divided 
by the ‘total quantity of shares’.  If this denominator is shares outstanding, all shares are 
assumed to be for sale and their elasticities are very small: 0.083 and 0.009 for mean local 
demand and supply elasticities, respectively.  If they scale instead by opening volume, only 
shareholders active at that time are assumed to be willing to trade and their elasticities are 
large: 415.4 and 63.6 for demand and supply elasticities, respectively. Scaling by total shares 
in the order book at open, or by mean daily volume, yields only slightly less extreme point 
estimates.  All of these scaling methods are defensible, as are others – such as the public float, 
or a smoothed trading volume.  
This issue affects the estimation of any demand and supply elasticities in any markets 
– for example, the potential total quantity of oil might be current inventories, “proven” 
reserves, “possible” reserves, or all geological deposits. While accepting the validity of this 
issue, we follow the conventional econometrics textbook approach (e.g., Greene, 1993) and 
estimate elasticities as log differences in quantities offered, or sought, divided by log 
differences in prices.  This lets the data choose a denominator at the cost of imposing a 
constant elasticity assumption across the whole length of each side of the limit order book. 
This assumption is clearly restrictive, but parsimoniously characterizes valuation 
heterogeneity across the broad price ranges we observe in the data.  
Since measuring this heterogeneity is our primary interest, the log on log specification 
is defensible.  However, alternative assumptions may well be preferable in other contexts. 
Subsequent sections therefore examine the robustness of our results to modifying this 
assumption and estimating elasticities using subsets of limit order books.     13
 
3.5.   Elasticity Measurement Procedure        
To measure the elasticity of demand in limit orders for firm j’s stock at time t, we regress the 
logarithm of total demand at that time at price pk, ln dj,t(pk), on the logarithm of pk,  
 
[3]  () k t j k
D
t j t j k t j u p a p d , , , , , ln ln + − = η  
 
The elasticity of demand at time t, 
D
t j, η , the percentage decrease in the quantity of stock j 
sought given a one percent price rise, is thus minus one times the coefficient of ln pk in [3].   
   The elasticity of supply at time t, 
S
t j, η , is the percentage increase in the quantity of 
stock offered given a one percent price rise, and so is  measured by the coefficient on ln pk in 
[4]. 
 
[4]  () k t j k
S
t j t j k t j v p b p s , , , , , ln ln + + = η  
  
Both demand and supply elasticities are each measured only when we have over five 
price-quantity pairs. In the final sample, the mean (median) number of pairs used is 17 (13) 
for opening auction demand elasticities and 17 (12) for opening auction supply elasticities, 
and 17 (14) and 21 (16) for 2:30 PM demand and supply elasticities, respectively.  The mean 
(median) regression R
2 of [3] at the opening auction and at 2:30 PM are 74% (76%) and 64% 
(65%) respectively; and, those of [4] are 80% (82%) and 72% (74%) respectively, suggesting 
that the log on log specification parsimoniously summarizes the data. 
Finally, although [3] and [4] use regression coefficients as elasticity measurements, 
no simultaneity bias arises.  This is because we are not jointly estimating demand and supply  14
curves from the same data.  Rather, we are plotting out observed demand and supply curves 
precisely and then using [3] and [4] to measure the slope of each side of the limit order book. 
 
3.6.   Limit Order Book Range  
As noted in Section 2, the elasticities of demand and supply schedules could reflect various 
sorts of investor heterogeneity – including information heterogeneity, patience heterogeneity, 
or some combination of the two. If investors are heterogeneously patient, finitely elastic 
demand and supply schedules could persist despite investors having homogenous information.  
This is because impatient investors compensate patient investors for immediate order 
execution by acquiescing to slightly disadvantageous prices.    
As noted above, the KSE lacks designated market makers.  Instead, new orders are 
matched against outstanding orders. But private traders can act as de facto market makers by 
standing ready to buy or sell at prices slightly below or above the market price.  Handa and 
Schwartz (1996) and Foucault et al. (2005) model such private market makers’ profits from 
trading at advantageous prices offsetting trading costs, non-execution costs, and 
disadvantageous fundamentals news; and suggest that limit orders around market prices may 
be associated with virtual market making rather than with genuine heterogeneous valuation.  
Hollifield et al. (2004, 2006) argue that investors whose private information implies 
valuations different from the market price are also those who provide liquidity as de facto 
market makers. If investors have more homogenous information, and are more certain of their 
valuations, this model implies that such de facto market makers would maximize their 
quasirents by placing limit orders close to the market price, where execution is likely. In 
contrast, if investors have more heterogeneous information or attach less certainty to their 
valuations, de facto market makers would place limit orders farther away from the current 
market price to avoid adverse selection.  15
We therefore examine the distribution of prices in limit order books. We believe 
Ockham’s razor favors these limit order books reflecting genuinely heterogeneous 
fundamental value estimates for several reasons: 
First, the price ranges at which we observe substantial limit order depth are quite 
broad, and so seem a priori inimical to de facto market making as a sole, or even primary 
explanation.  Panels A and B of Table 2 show substantial limit order depths beyond 3% away 
from the observed market price – open prices in morning auctions or bid-ask midpoints at 
2:30 PM for each schedule.  This is equivalent to a 6% spread in a specialist market. These 
limit orders represent about 71% and 74.1% of total limit buy and sell orders for the opening 
auction and 69.4% and 75.2% for 2:30 PM, respectively.  Only 10.5% (9.1%) of total 
quantities demanded (supplied) fall within a one percent range around the market price at the 
opening auction and only 10.2% (6.6%) at 2:30 PM. Such a substantial width in the limit 
order distribution seems consistent with heterogeneous investor beliefs, or at least, liquidity 
provision by investors with heterogeneous valuations as in Hollifield et al. (2004, 2006). 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
  
Second, Korea levies a 0.3% Tobin tax on all stock sales, even by brokers’ trading on 
their own accounts.  Public shareholders serving as liquidity providers confront even higher 
transactions costs, for in 2000, brokerage fees ranged from 0.35% to 0.5%, though online 
trading costs fell sharply after June 1998, and now range between 0.025% and 0.1%.  Such 
costs could render limit orders solely to provide liquidity more costly.  
Third, Table 1 shows market orders comprising only 5.22% of shares sought and 
7.01% of shares offered.  If limit orders existed primarily to provide liquidity around market 
prices, they ought not to preponder market orders greatly, for the latter ought to include much  16
of the demand for quick execution.  Aggregated limit order magnitudes, roughly sixteen to 
twenty-fold greater than market orders at 2:30 PM and seven to thirteen-fold greater in the 
opening auction, seem superfluous.   
This evidence is admittedly circumstantial, for our findings could conceivably just 
reflect substantial impatience heterogeneity, rather than information-based heterogeneity. We 
therefore pursue this issue further below. First, Section 3.7 re-estimates elasticities excluding 
price-quantity pairs proximate to market prices, where liquidity provision absent valuation 
heterogeneity is most plausible. Second, Sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 demonstrate a high 
frequency negative correlation between elasticities of demand and supply. Based on these 
findings, Section 4.6 argues that information heterogeneity among investors is a plausible 
explanation of our findings. 
 
3.7.   Whole and Cored Elasticities  
Equations [3] and [4] assume constant elasticity across all prices. This assumption injects 
noise if the true elasticity varies across prices, but becomes even more problematic if 
Hollifield et al. (2004, 2006) do not apply; and limit orders near the market price reflect 
competitive market making by liquidity providers with no genuinely divergent valuations. 
We can mitigate, and evaluate, these concerns by estimating elasticities after removing 
observations near the market price, where competitive market makings unassociated with 
valuation heterogeneity is most likely.   
We define near-market limit orders as those priced in the interval (pm(1 – k), pm(1 +  
k)), centered around the market price, pm, with k set to one, two, and then three percent of the 
market price. By dropping price-quantity pairs with prices in these successively larger near-
market intervals, we obtain cored supply and demand schedules, so-named because of the 
holes around their market prices.  At all non-near-market prices, these demand and supply  17
schedules are identical to those described above. That is, given a supply schedule of price-
quantity pairs {(p, s(p)}, we denote the corresponding cored supply schedules, Cs(k), for k = 
one, two, or three percent, as 
 
[5]    } ) k), (1   [ k)] - (1 , 0 ( | )) ( , {( ) ( +∞ + ∪ ∈ ≡ m m s p p p p s p k C . 
 
Cored demand schedule are similarly defined. 
  We then run [3] and [4] on these cored demand and supply schedules to obtain cored 
elasticities of demand or supply.  
 
4.   Empirical Results 
This section first reports summary statistics of demand and supply elasticities; and then 
presents firm-level daily panel regressions. We divide our sample period into three sub-
periods; a pre-crisis period of December 1996 through October 1997, an in-crisis period of 
November 1997 to October 1998, and a post-crisis period of November 1998 to December 




[Figure 3 about here] 
 
4.1.   Magnitudes  
Panels A and B of Figure 3 plot the time series of daily mean elasticities against time; Panel 
C of Figure 3 plots the KSE index for the same period. Table 3 reports the summary statistics 
of underlying firm-level daily elasticities of demand and supply curves. Table 3 shows the 
                                                 
8 In November, 1997, the Bank of Korea stopped defending Korean Won and Korean government requested IMF bail-out.  18
median demand elasticities to be about 20 both in opening auctions and at 2:30 PM; while the 
median supply elasticities are 24 in opening auctions and 23 at 2:30 PM. A one percent 




[Table 3 about here] 
 
All of the elasticity estimates in Panels A and B of Table 3 are significantly below 
infinity; in the sense that their reciprocals significantly differ from zero.  Whether we use 
whole demand and supply schedules or cored demand and supply schedules to estimate η
D 
and η
S, standard t-tests and rank tests show the means and medians of both 1/η
D and 1/η
S to 
differ significantly from zero (p < 0.0001). 
Our elasticity measurements generally exceed the 10.50 figure imputed by Kaul et al. 
(2000), the 7.89 estimate obtained by Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002), the mean (median) 
elasticity of 0.68 (1.05) reported by Bagwell (1992) from Dutch auction share repurchases, 
and the mean (median) estimates of 2.91 (2.47) by Kandel et al. (1999) from IPO data. Our 
estimates lie between the lower and upper bounds determined by Kalay et al. (2004).  
These differences might reflect different methodologies, unique information events 
used in some of the studies, or different institutional arrangements in different countries or 
time periods.  For example, KSE investors observe quantities demanded and supplied at the 
five best prices during our sample period, whereas investors in other stock markets have less 
information, so higher average KSE elasticities are not entirely surprising.  
We also check the differences between elasticities observed in opening auctions and 
those observed at 2:30 PM. If uncertainty regarding private information were appreciably 
                                                 
9 Cored elasticities generate similar patterns. Section 4.2 discusses this issue in detail.  19
resolved by trading, as proposed by Glosten and Milgrom (1985), elasticities should rise 
through the day. Through our sample period, 2:30 PM mean elasticities generally exceed 
mean opening auction elasticities – consistent with the findings of Kalay et al. (2004). 
However, our analogous median measurements show no discernable intraday pattern.  
 
4.2.    Harmony at Low Frequencies  
One advantage of a long time series that includes a crisis is that it allows a comparison of the 
magnitudes of elasticities before and after the crisis using one measurement methodology. 
Thus, even if absolute magnitudes are not directly comparable across studies that use 
different estimation methods, we can make valid comparisons over time for KSE stocks.  The 
average elasticities of both demand and supply fluctuate far more during the last months of 
1997 and the first months of 1998 than either before or after. This period of instability 
corresponding to the onset of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, evident in the KSE index in 
Panel A of Figure 3, is unsurprising.   
More intriguingly, elasticities of both demand and supply are markedly lower after 
this interlude of instability, implying more heterogeneous valuations across investors in the 
post-crisis period. Table 3 shows a 39% drop, from 30.0 to 18.3, in the median opening 
auction demand elasticity; and a 41% drop, from 36.9 to 21.9 in the median opening auction 
supply elasticity. Similarly dramatic reductions are evident in 2:30 PM measurements; and in 
the means as well. These differences are all statistically significant (p < 0.0001). Note that 
even after the KSE market index reverts to the pre-crisis level, elasticities of both curves 
remain depressed through the remainder of our sample period. This suggests that the crisis 
permanently altered both demand and supply curves, to reflect permanently elevated 
heterogeneity across investors in firm valuations.  
Substantial fluctuation at higher frequencies is clearly superimposed on this step  20
function.  However, elasticities fluctuate around stable averages in both the pre- and post-
crisis periods, and no trend in the magnitude of these higher frequency fluctuations is 
immediately evident for each sub-period. These regularities suggest an underlying factor, 
common to demand and supply elasticities, which follows a step function; but otherwise 
changes little before or after the crisis. Possible candidates would be several institutional 
reforms that have permanent impact. However, we can exclude them because many of post-
crisis reforms arguably rendered the country’s equity market more transparent and thus 
lowered arbitrage costs. Greater transparency should decrease information heterogeneity, 
leaving both curves more elastic, all else equal. The advent of low-cost online trading after 
June 1998, at first blush at least, should have reduced arbitrage costs and flattened demand 
and supply curves as well.   
In our sample, supply is generally more elastic than demand. The difference in means 
is highly significant (p  < 0.0001) throughout all three sub-periods. Thus higher supply 
elasticities are not artifacts of fire sales during the crisis period. Kalay et al. (2004) find 
supply less locally elastic (around market prices) than demand for stocks traded in Tel Aviv 
Stock Exchange (TASE), and posit short sale constraints as an explanation. Short sales are 
uncommon on the KSE, comprising only about 0.5% of pre-crisis sell orders and an 
essentially negligible fraction in the post-crisis sub-period. Thus, our relatively high supply 
elasticities are not readily explained by more intense short sale activities in KSE than in 
TASE.   
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
To see if our results are driven by orders near market prices, we repeat the exercise 
using cored elasticities. Figure 4 shows the permanent decrease in mean elasticities is robust  21
to dropping limit orders priced within one, two, and three percent of the market price. Similar 
patterns are evident if we use median elasticities instead. Thus, the significant drop in 
elasticities we observe is not driven by orders near market prices. 
Within each sub-period, mean elasticities are larger if the elasticities are estimated 
using orders farther away from the market price, though this difference attenuates in the post- 
crisis period.
10 Higher elasticities for limit orders farther away from the market price in the 
pre-crisis period are consistent with investors’ valuations being more homogeneous before 
the crisis than after it.  
The finite elasticities evident in Panels A and B of Figure 4 throughout our sample 
period, even after excluding orders near market prices, are consistent with the persistence of 
economically important information heterogeneity, and thus reinforce the clues in Table 2. 
Since the KSE lets any trader help make the market in any stock, competitive pressure on de 
facto market makers lacking any private information would induce large limit orders near the 
market price where execution probability is large.  Although extreme demand for liquidity 
might occasionally invite such orders farther from the market price, a persistent high density 
in the tails of the limit order distribution presents at least a strong circumstantial case for 
information heterogeneity.  That is, investors would enter such orders only if they genuinely 
expected the price to move to a new range.  For example, investors holding a stock they 
believe undervalued might enter high sell orders in anticipation of an upward correction.  
Investors expecting an overvalued stock to fall might enter low buy limit orders for analogous 
reasons. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
                                                 
10 The slightly higher elasticities generated by dropping limit orders within three percent of the market price may reflect a 
reduced sample, since we require more than five price-quantity pairs to estimate elasticities. Stocks with scant limit order 
depth away from the market price thus fall out of the sample, and these may be either thinly traded or subject to little 
valuation heterogeneity. However, the same pattern is evident using recalculated mean and median elasticities based on the 
whole demand or supply schedules and on the various cored schedules defined in [5], but using only those firm-day 
observations for which three percent cored schedules are measurable.    22
 
4.3.    Counterpoint at Higher Frequencies? 
Figure 5 plots individual stocks’ daily mean demand elasticities against daily mean supply 
elasticities using first opening auction and then 2:30 PM snapshots, and using first elasticities 
measured across the whole limit order book and then our various cored elasticities. A clear 
negative relationship is evident in the 2:30 PM elasticities. A similar negative relationship 
becomes apparent in the opening auction elasticities after dropping limit orders within one 
percent of the market price, and persists with the other cored elasticities as well.   
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
To verify these visual patterns, we estimate the simple correlation of daily mean 
demand elasticities with daily mean supply elasticities each month. Figure 6 plots these 
against time, showing that they jibe roughly with the patterns apparent in Figure 5.  The 
correlation is strongly negative for elasticities based on the 2:30 PM snapshots, regardless of 
whether we use whole elasticities or cored elasticities. A similarly robust negative correlation 
of a similar magnitude is evident using cored elasticities, but less apparent in using whole 
elasticities at the opening auctions.   
The crystallization of a clear negative correlation, after dropping limit orders within 
one percent of the market price at the opening auction, may be explained by Figure 1.  This 
shows the demand and supply curves at the opening auction intersecting to the right of the 
price axis.  The opening auction includes above-market buy orders and below-market sell 
orders because investors cannot observe the market price until the auction is completed.  In 
contrast, investors observe the market price at 2:30 PM, precluding above-market buy limit 
orders and below-market sell limit orders.  The orders entered at such disadvantageous prices  23
in the opening auction actually execute at the market price, and so are, in effect, transformed 
into market orders.  Consequently, deleting them by using the cored elasticities is clearly 
warranted.   
 
4.4.    Panel Regressions  
To investigate this contemporaneous negative high frequency correlation further, we turn to 
panel regressions using daily firm-level elasticities. We demean these data using cross-
section means to remove any temporal fixed effects, and also include firm fixed effects to 
control for any firm characteristics that might affect elasticities. Thus, we run  
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S
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D
t η the mean elasticities of supply and 
demand, respectively, across all stocks at time t; and the  j α  are firm fixed effects.   We also 
cluster standard errors by firm to adjust for any autocorrelation in the elasticities.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Table 4 presents estimates of β from [6] using whole elasticities and the cored 
elasticities described in [5] for our entire sample period and for the pre-crisis, in-crisis, and 
post-crisis subperiods. Highly significant negative coefficients arise in every case for the 2:30 
PM elasticities, and in every case for the opening auction elasticities of cored demand and 
supply schedules.  The sole exception is opening auction elasticities of whole demand and  24
supply schedule. We conclude that the firm-level panel regressions in Table 4 confirm the 
patterns apparent in Figures 5 and 6.   
  
4.5.    Robustness Checks  
A variety of robustness checks generate qualitatively similar results, by which we mean 
similar patterns of signs and statistical significance to those in Table 4.  
We cluster standard errors by firm.  Clustering by time generates qualitatively similar 
results.     
  We measure fewer stocks’ elasticities when we use cored elasticities, for which we 
exclude the section of the demand or supply schedule near the market price.  This is because 
we require more than five price-quantity points to take a measurement. The smallest sample 
arises for elasticities defined using C(0.03) which encompasses only demand or supply 
schedule points more than three percent above or below the market price.  Rerunning 
regressions using this smaller set of stocks but using elasticities based on the whole schedules 
and the other cored schedules, occluding limit orders within only one and two percent of the 
market, also yields qualitatively similar results. That is, except for opening auction elasticities 
based on whole schedules, all the coefficients are highly significantly negative.  
We rerun the regressions in Panels A and B of Table 4 weighting each pair of 
elasticities by the firm’s market capitalization at the previous day’s close.  This is to see if our 
results differ across larger or smaller firms, which might inhabit different information 
environments for many reasons. Again, qualitatively similar results to those in Table 4 ensue.   
 
4.6.  Clinching the Case for Information Heterogeneity  
A negative contemporaneous correlation between the elasticities of a stock’s supply and 
demand schedules is difficult to explain if finite elasticities reflect only liquidity provision,  25
and not information heterogeneity.  Absent heterogeneous private valuations, buy-side 
liquidity provision should not evaporate if sell-side liquidity provision deepens, and vice 
versa.   
However, this high frequency negative correlation between supply and demand 
elasticities is entirely consistent with some traders acquiring private information, as in French 
and Roll (1986) and Roll (1988), and with other investors inferring that information by 
observing trading patterns, as in Glosten and Milgrom (1985).  We speculate that aggressive limit 
order placement by privately informed traders would increase the elasticity on their side of 
the limit order book; and that investors on the other side, observing this and fearing they are 
at an informational disadvantage, would withdraw limit order depth, lowering the elasticity 
on their side of the limit order book.  For example, an eruption of large buy orders would 
flatten the demand curve, but signal sell side limit order providers that private information is 
afoot.  Fearing adverse selection, sell side limit order providers would reduce their exposure 
by withdrawing limit order depth, rendering the supply curve more inelastic.  
This sort of feedback raises interesting possibilities for extending models of 
information heterogeneity and liquidity provision, such as Hollifield et al. (2004, 2006), to 
include the reactions of uninformed traders and the process by which private information 
propagates through the market and becomes public.    
 
5.   Conclusions 
The asset pricing literature descended from Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Grossman and 
Stiglitz (1980) posits finitely elastic demand and supply curves for individual stocks with 
elasticities determined by investors’ risk aversion, information heterogeneity, and uncertainty 
regarding fundamental valuations. Blough (1988), Hindy (1989), De Long et al. (1990), 
Kandel and Peason (1995), Harris and Raviv (1993), Varian (1985, 1989), Shleifer and  26
Vishny (1997), and others all elaborate theories along these lines, which in one way or 
another, all preserve the assumption of finite elasticities.   
We observe (not estimate) elasticities of the demand and supply curves of individual 
stocks’ limit orders on the Korea Stock Exchange and find that these are unambiguously 
finite.  Our results, subject to the caveat that limit order books do not measure all latent 
supply and demand away from the market price, are thus consistent with the approach to asset 
pricing set forth in this literature.   
The Asian financial crisis, which occurred midway through our sample period, upset 
conventional frameworks for understanding the Korean economy, and induced dramatic 
changes in the business strategies of many Korean firms. Such factors may have increased the 
heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs about fundamental values.  The crisis also reduced the 
wealth of many investors, and arguably also heightened their perceptions of the risks inherent 
in equity – factors most readily interpreted as elevated risk aversion among investors. 
Information heterogeneity and investor risk aversion are both plausible determinants of the 
elasticities of demand and supply curves for individual stocks in models permitting 
heterogeneous investor perceptions of fundamental values.   
Elasticities of both supply and demand are about 40% lower in the post-crisis period 
than in the pre-crisis period, and do not revert within our entire sample period– although 
other financial and economic indicators do return to their pre-crisis levels.  This pattern 
seems consistent with elevated valuation heterogeneity and uncertainty, with elevated risk 
aversion, or with both.  This pattern is also consistent with investors possessing private 
information being less likely to enter large orders based on that information, and with 
liquidity providers fearing trading against better informed investors and therefore being more 
cautious about providing limit order depth.  If so, a financial crisis may render a stock market 
less able to assimilate private information.    27
The elasticities of demand and supply in a stock’s limit order book typically exhibit a 
contemporaneous negative correlation in high frequency (daily) data. We speculate as to how 
informed investors entering one side of the market with large orders would flatten one of the 
two curves, and how uninformed investors on the other side, reacting to this, would withdraw 
limit order depth, steepening the other curve.   
The patterns we detect in the observed (not estimated) limit order elasticities of 
demand and supply of individual common stocks call for further theoretical work to ascertain 
the interactions between changing information heterogeneity, valuation uncertainty, and risk 
aversion. We especially encourage new models of the strategic interactions of risk-averse 
buyers and sellers of financial assets in markets with heterogeneous information; and of how 
rational traders infer new private information and react upon detecting it.  Of course, we also 
welcome further empirical work to qualify our findings, geographically or temporally, or to 
advance alternative explanations of the robust empirical regularities described above.   
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Figure 1.  Observed Demand and Supply Schedules for Samsung Electronics  
on November 11, 2000 
The opening auction orders graphs (black) reflect all buy and sell orders submitted for the opening 
auction that sets the open price. The 2:30 PM limit orders graphs (gray) reflect all outstanding limit 
orders as of 2:30 PM.   
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Figure 2.  Demand and Supply Schedules in Real Time for Samsung Electronics on November 11, 2000 
Demand and supply schedules for Samsung stock from the opening auction orders through the end of trading constructed from snapshots of complete limit 
order books taken every 15 minutes.   
 
Panel A:  Supply of Samsung at 15 minute intervals                    Panel B:  Demand for Samsung at 15 minute intervals 
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Figure 3.  Mean Demand and Supply Elasticities of Individual Stocks over Time 
Each stock’s elasticity of demand is the negative of the coefficient of log price in a regression 
explaining log quantity demanded at that price in the stock’s limit order book; while its elasticity of 
supply is the coefficient in an analogous regression explaining log quantity supplied. Elasticities are 
estimated whenever the stock’s relevant limit order schedule contains over five price-quantity pairs.  
Elasticities are measured twice each day from Dec. 1996 to Dec. 2000:  first in the opening auction 
and again at 2:30 PM.  Until December 5, 1998, the KSE was opened Saturday mornings, and the 
second elasticity is estimated at 11:30 AM on Saturdays.   Daily elasticities are averaged across all 
stocks and this mean is graphed against time. The East Asian Financial Crisis period is the widened 
time axis segment from Nov. 1997 to Oct. 1998.  The pre-crisis, and post- crisis periods are Dec. 
1996 to Oct. 1997, and Nov. 1998 to Dec. 2000, respectively.       
 
Panel A: Opening Auction Elasticities 
Panel B: 2:30 PM Elasticities 
Panel C: KSE Index   33
Figure 4.  Mean Elasticities for the Whole Sample and Subsamples Dropping 
Limit Orders Priced within One, Two, or Three Percent of the Market Price.     
Each stock’s elasticity of demand is the negative of the coefficient of log price in a regression 
explaining log quantity demanded at that price in the stock’s limit order book; while its elasticity of 
supply is the coefficient in an analogous regression explaining log quantity supplied. Elasticities are 
estimated whenever the stock’s relevant limit order schedule contains over five price-quantity pairs, 
for the whole sample and subsamples where observations within [-k%, k%] range around market 
prices are removed for k=1,2, or 3. Elasticities are measured twice each day from Dec. 1996 to Dec. 
2000:  first in the opening auction and again at 2:30 PM.  Until December 5, 1998, the KSE was 
opened Saturday mornings, and the second elasticity is estimated at 11:30 AM on Saturdays. Daily 
elasticities are averaged across all stocks and then across days in specified periods:  the entire 
sample, pre-crisis (December 1996 – October 1997), in-crisis (November 1997 – October 1998), and 
post-crisis (November 1998 – December 2000) periods.   
 
Panel A:  Demand Elasticities at Opening Auction and at 2:30 PM 
 
 
Panel B:  Supply Elasticities at Opening Auction and at 2:30 PM  
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Figure 5.  Relationship Between Daily Average Demand and Supply Elasticities 
Daily average supply elasticity is plotted against daily average demand elasticity, with observations 
color coded for pre-crisis (December 1996 – October 1997), in-crisis (November 1997 – October 
1998), and post-crisis (November 1998 – December 2000) periods. Each stock’s elasticity of demand 
is the negative of the coefficient of log price in a regression explaining log quantity demanded at that 
price in the stock’s limit order book; while its elasticity of supply is the coefficient in an analogous 
regression explaining log quantity supplied. Elasticities are estimated whenever the stock’s relevant 
limit order schedule contains over five price-quantity pairs; for the whole sample and subsamples 
dropping observations within one, two, or three percent of market prices. Elasticities are measured 
twice each day from Dec. 1996 to Dec. 2000:  first in the opening auction and again at 2:30 PM.  Until 
December 5, 1998, the KSE was opened Saturday mornings, and the second elasticity is estimated at 
11:30 AM on Saturdays. 
    
Panel A:  Elasticities at Opening Auction 
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Figure 6.  Correlations of Individual Stocks’ Daily Mean Demand and Supply 
Elasticities, by Month  
Each stock’s elasticity of demand is the negative of the coefficient of log price in a regression 
explaining log quantity demanded at that price in the stock’s limit order book; while its elasticity of 
supply is the coefficient in an analogous regression explaining log quantity supplied. Elasticities are 
measured from Dec. 1996 through Dec. 2000 at the open and at 2:30PM whenever the stock’s 
relevant limit order schedule contains over five price-quantity pairs.  Plots include correlations using 
the elasticities based on all limit orders, as well as those based on subsamples dropping limit orders 
within one, two, and three percent of the market prices. Until December 5, 1998, the KSE operated 
Saturday mornings, so the second elasticity on those days is estimated at 11:30AM. Correlations are 
of daily supply and demand elasticities, using all days in each month. 
 
Panel A:  Correlations of Daily Mean Demand and Supply Elasticities Measured at Opening 
Auctions  
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Table 1.  Distribution of Orders and Trades 
Orders can be limit or market orders, and can be submitted in an opening auction or in continuous 
trading throughout the day. Data are for common stocks trading on the Korea Stock Exchange (KSE) 
during December 1996 to December 2000.  Each daily trading session is partitioned into an opening 
auction and the continuous trading during the rest of the day. Values in parentheses are average 
order sizes. 
 
Order Type Entire Day Opening Auction



























































Table 2. Limit Order Book Ranges 
On each trading day, the limit order book prices for the opening auction are normalized by the 
opening price while the limit order book prices at 2:30 PM are normalized by the bid-ask mid-point.  
Then, quantities (in millions of shares) demanded and supplied in each price range are accumulated 
over the sample period of December 1996 to December 2000. 
 
Quantity
Percent of Total 
Quantity Quantity
Percent of Total 
Quantity
Price < 85% 4,987 14.00% 64 0.20%
85% ≤ Price < 90% 5,945 16.7 121 0.4
90% ≤ Price < 95% 8,206 23 315 1
95% ≤ Price < 97% 5,077 14.2 350 1.2
97% ≤ Price < 98% 2,790 7.8 314 1
98% ≤ Price < 99% 2,793 7.8 515 1.7
99% ≤ Price < 100% 2,712 7.6 757 2.5
100% ≤ Price < 101% 1,052 2.9 2,011 6.6
101% ≤ Price < 102% 631 1.8 2,069 6.8
102% ≤ Price < 103% 384 1.1 2,238 7.4
103% ≤ Price < 105% 415 1.2 4,715 15.5
105% ≤ Price < 110% 413 1.2 9,454 31.1
110% ≤ Price < 115% 160 0.4 5,564 18.3
115% ≤ Price 95 0.3 1,938 6.4
Total 35,659 100.00% 30,423 100.00%
Limit Order Price as Percent of 
Opening Price
Demand Supply




Percent of Total 
Quantity Quantity
Percent of Total 
Quantity
Price < 85% 6,044 13.80%
85% ≤ Price < 90% 7,984 18.2
90% ≤ Price < 95% 10,053 22.9
95% ≤ Price < 97% 6,359 14.5
97% ≤ Price < 98%  4,102 9.3
98% ≤ Price < 99% 4,907 11.2
99% ≤ Price < 100% 4,476 10.2
100% ≤ Price < 101% 3,321 6.60%
101% ≤ Price < 102% 4,521 9
102% ≤ Price < 103% 4,610 9.2
103% ≤ Price < 105% 8,651 17.2
105% ≤ Price < 110% 15,438 30.8
110% ≤ Price < 115% 8,563 17.1
115% ≤ Price 5,088 10.1
Total 43,925 100.00% 50,193 100.00%
Panel B: 2:30 PM












Table 3. Elasticities of KSE Stocks Before, During, and After the 1997 Crisis 
Each stock’s elasticity of demand is the negative of the coefficient of log price in a regression 
explaining log quantity demanded at that price in its limit order book; while its elasticity of supply is the 
coefficient in an analogous regression explaining log quantity supplied. Elasticities are measured 
twice each day from Dec. 1996 to Dec. 2000:  first in the opening auction and again at 2:30 PM.  
Elasticities are estimated if over five price-quantity pairs exist for each firm, each day. All means and 
medians are significantly below infinity; that is, t-tests and rank tests, respectively, reject the null 
hypotheses of their reciprocals being zero at probability levels better than one percent. Until 
December 5, 1998, the KSE was opened Saturday mornings, and the second elasticity is estimated at 
11:30 AM on Saturdays.   Daily elasticities are averaged across all stocks and then observed across 
all days in the specified time periods:  the entire sample, pre-crisis (December 1996 – October 1997), 
in-crisis (November 1997 – October 1998), and post-crisis (November 1998 – December 2000) 
periods. 
 
Trading Session Sub-Period Observations Mean Median Std. Dev.
Opening auction Entire sample period 605,407 22.690 20.320 12.772
Pre-crisis period 120,588 32.078 30.015 16.765
In-crisis period 139,188 23.102 21.484 12.777
Post-crisis period 345,631 19.249 18.26 8.903
2:30 PM Entire sample period 591,996 24.791 19.597 20.259
Pre-crisis period 122,214 35.189 29.652 24.322
In-crisis period 128,252 27.908 22.5 22.027
Post-crisis period 341,530 19.899 16.674 15.851
Panel A: Elasticity of Demand
 
 
Trading Session Sub-Period Observations Mean Median Std. Dev.
Opening auction Entire sample period 608,952 27.048 24.409 14.341
Pre-crisis period 125,565 38.594 36.88 18.215
In-crisis period 136,922 27.535 25.626 14.862
Post-crisis period 346,465 22.671 21.895 9.293
2:30 PM Entire sample period 632,702 28.822 23.368 22.257
Pre-crisis period 147,261 38.096 32.885 24.297
In-crisis period 139,688 30.372 25.039 23.174
Post-crisis period 345,753 24.246 20.402 19.482




Table 4.  Panel Regressions of Supply on Demand Elasticities   




t j , , ,
~ ~ ε η β α η + + = , with 
S
t j,
~ η  and 
D
t j,
~ η  stock j’s market-
adjusted limit order supply and demand elasticities on day t and αj  firm fixed effects. We obtain 
market-adjusted elasticities of firm j by subtracting the day t’s cross-sectional mean supply or demand 
elasticity across all firms from firm j’s supply or demand elasticities.  Each stock’s elasticity of demand 
is the negative of the coefficient of log price in a regression explaining log quantity demanded; while 
its elasticity of supply is the coefficient in an analogous regression explaining log quantity supplied. 
Elasticities are estimated whenever a schedule has more than 5 price-quantity pairs.  Whole 
elasticities are estimated using whole demand or supply limit order schedules, cored elasticities use 
all parts of the schedules except intervals within one, two, or three percent around market prices. 
Panel A uses elasticities at the opening auction and Panel B uses elasticity snapshots or limit order 
books at 2:30 PM, 30 minutes before the close.  Until December 5, 1998, the KSE was opened 
Saturdays until noon, so the second elasticity is measured at 11:30 those days. The sample is 
partitioned into pre-crisis (Dec. 1996 – Oct. 1997), in-crisis (Nov. 1997 – Oct. 1998), and post-crisis 












Whole Estimate of β 0.006 -0.006 -0.016 0.007
p-value 0.016 0.166 0.000 0.008
Adjusted R
2 0.027 0.046 0.044 0.049
Observations 530,405 89,321 110,910 330,174
Cored at 1% Estimate of β -0.107 -0.129 -0.146 -0.083
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R
2 0.019 0.042 0.027 0.020
Observations 423,593 45,162 78,700 299,731
Cored at 2% Estimate of β -0.113 -0.166 -0.150 -0.098
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R
2 0.022 0.050 0.030 0.021
Observations 372,210 24,547 64,633 283,030
Cored at 3% Estimate of β -0.106 -0.182 -0.131 -0.119
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R
2 0.021 0.039 0.022 0.022
Observations 321,442 10,324 50,022 261,096
Panel A: Panel Regression of Supply on Demand Elasticity at Opening Auction, with Day and 



























Whole Estimate of β -0.178 -0.187 -0.206 -0.167
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R
2 0.030 0.045 0.044 0.029
Observations 544,224 102,645 111,088 330,491
Cored at 1% Estimate of β -0.156 -0.176 -0.194 -0.143
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R
2 0.024 0.045 0.037 0.023
Observations 491,918 70,914 99,680 321,324
Cored at 2% Estimate of β -0.161 -0.217 -0.187 -0.157
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R
2 0.024 0.049 0.035 0.023
Observations 420,849 36,908 80,716 303,225
Cored at 3% Estimate of β -0.164 -0.252 -0.176 -0.181
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Adjusted R
2 0.026 0.053 0.033 0.027
Observations 351,460 14,539 59,708 277,213
Panel B: Panel Regression of Supply on Demand Elasticity at 2:30 PM, with Day and Firm Fixed 
Effects and Firm-Clustered Standard Errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 